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PREFACE
Public Finance in Post-conflict
environments: A Policy Paper Series
In the wake of violent conflict, a key element of building
a durable peace is building a state with the ability to
collect and manage public resources. To implement
peace accords and to provide public services, the
government must be able to collect revenue, allocate
resources, and manage expenditure in a manner that is
regarded by its citizens as effective and equitable.
The tasks of revenue mobilization, budget allocation,
and expenditure management are bound together
by political imperatives as well as economic logic. To
collect revenues, the state must be seen as legitimate
in the eyes of its citizens. And to secure legitimacy, the
state must allocate resources and manage expenditure
effectively and equitably.
The need to build legitimate and capable states in wartorn societies is now widely recognized. The Principles
for Good International Engagement in Fragile States,
adopted by the development ministers of major donor
countries in March 2005, declares that statebuilding is
‘the central objective.’ This represents a striking break
from the prevailing wisdom in the closing decades of
the 20th century, when the state was widely regarded as
the problem. The state has been rediscovered: it is now
invoked as the solution.The policy rhetoric has changed
from downsizing states to building state capacity.
Yet little systematic work has been done on what
the international community can and should do to
strengthen the capacities of post-war states to mobilize,
allocate, and spend public resources.
This policy paper series, jointly published by the
Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at New York
University and the Political Economy Research Institute
(PERI) at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst,
seeks to redress this gap by presenting innovative
policy proposals targeting critical issues in postwar
public finance.
Building state capacities in public finance is crucial to
the success of peacebuilding efforts for three reasons:
»» First, governments must be able to ensure
sustainable funding for new democratic
institutions, for social programs that ease tensions
and redress grievances, and for public investments
to promote economic growth and development. In
the early post-war years, countries often receive a

large influx of external assistance that temporarily
can meet some of these needs. But aid typically
diminishes over time, so domestic resources
are necessary to sustain these institutions and
programs. A key challenge is to ensure that aid
does not ‘crowd out’ domestic fiscal capacities, but
instead stimulates their growth.
»» Second, fiscal capacities are needed to build a
legitimate state. Democratic elections do not, in
and of themselves, ensure state legitimacy. Neither
do ‘quick impact projects’ in which international
aid agencies seek to fill urgent needs. Legitimacy
comes in large part from government delivery of
services that people need and want. Elections
provide an avenue for the citizenry to voice
demands; responding to those demands requires
the capacity to mobilize, allocate, and spend public
resources effectively.
»» Third, in some cases there is a need to curtail extralegal taxation by ‘warlords’ and armed groups so as
to enhance security. In Afghanistan, for example,
control of border customs outposts is not only a
fiscal issue but also a security issue. Similarly, control
over revenues from natural-resource extraction,
such as logging in Cambodia or diamonds in West
Africa, is often crucial for establishing the state’s
monopoly not only in legitimate taxation but also
in legitimate force. At the same time, domestic fiscal
capacity is the only sustainable source of financing
for public security after external peacekeepers
have withdrawn.
The papers in this series offer policy proposals designed
to strengthen the fiscal dimension of statebuilding.
The authors draw on extensive personal experience
in public finance matters in war-torn societies, and
on lessons from comparative studies, including Peace
and the Public Purse: Economic Policies for Postwar
Statebuilding (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2007), the
outcome of the first stage of the CIC’s statebuilding
project. After a concise recapitulation of the problems
to be addressed, the authors concentrate on proposing
solutions that can be practically implemented.
We hope these policy papers will find a wide audience
amongst those who are grappling with the difficult
challenges of post-war reconstruction, and that the
proposals they put forward will assist in the twin tasks
of building legitimate and effective states and building
a durable peace.
James K. Boyce
Lead economist, Peacebuilding as Statebuilding Program
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RIGHT-FINANCING
SECURITY SECTOR
REFORM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Security sector reform (SSR) in weak and fragile
state environments encompasses a broad range
of efforts to improve the capacity, governance,
performance, and sustainability of the security
system. Financial dimensions of SSR include the
allocation of resources according to well-defined
priorities, both across sectors and within the
security system, and ensuring that expenditure
is transparent, efficient and effective. Issues of
financial management were central to the origins
of SSR in the 1990s, and they are no less central
to security sector reform today. Yet current SSR
strategies and programming all too often pay
insufficient attention to public finance issues.
As a result, the medium and long-term fiscal
implications of short-run policy decisions are
not factored into early post-conflict engagement
processes. The negative consequences include
unsustainable reforms, the squeezing out of other
vital sectors, and, conversely, the under-provision
of security.
This paper argues for the “right-financing”
approach to be adopted for the security sector –
striking an appropriate balance between current
security needs and the goal of building a fiscally
sustainable security sector based on realistic
resource projections. This paper makes four policy
proposals:
1. BUILD FISCAL DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY
INTO PEACE AGREEMENTS, POST-CONFLICT
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS, DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGIES, AND EXPENDITURE PLANNING
Long-term fiscal sustainability is strongly
influenced by early decisions. Bringing rightfinancing considerations to the negotiating table
can minimize the problems caused by fiscally
blind security policies. Peace agreements should
acknowledge that size targets for the security

sector are subject to fiscal constraints, and
therefore tentative. Including the security sector in
initial post-conflict needs assessments – the main
tool used by donors for assessing reconstruction
costs and needs – would promote mainstreaming
of SSR into wider development strategies, rather
than treating the sector as “stand-alone.” In the
immediate aftermath of violent conflict, provisional
macro-fiscal forecasts, developed with the help of
the international financial institutions (IFIs), would
assist security sector planners in prioritizing and
making sustainable force size and composition
decisions, while also informing donor decisions
related to the establishment and phasing out of
trust funds.
2. ALIGN SHORT-RUN SECURITY POLICY
PRIORITIES AND SPENDING DECISIONS
WITH LONG TERM NATIONAL BUDGETARY
AND POLITICAL REALITIES.
The budget ought to be the primary tool of policy,
and security sector reform should be funded in a
balanced and fiscally sensitive manner. At present,
such decisions are often instead made on the basis
of short-term national and international priorities.
SSR assessment should consider the short, medium,
and long-term security and fiscal impacts of
different force sizes, functions, and pay and grading
options. Trust funds established by donors to
support payment of police or military staff where
state revenues remain insufficient should include
clear “exit strategies” for an orderly transition to
a normal budgetary process. In assessing security
needs, the orientation of the security sector has
direct implications for how priorities, targets,
and financing mechanisms are determined. A key
question guiding policy must be, “security for
whom?” The size, structure, and function of the
security, law and order and justice system ought
to be transformed based on public demand, rather
than simply supply. Non-state systems – including
traditional and customary security and justice
providers – are often more effective, accessible,
legitimate, and cheaper than the formal security
sector. At a particular moment and in a given
context, these institutions might serve as viable
alternatives to state forces.
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3. MOVE TO A SERVICE DELIVERY MODEL
FOR THE SECURITY SECTOR
Service delivery benchmarks are commonly
set for sectors such as health, education and
transport, but not for the security sector. There
is a paucity of reliable, valid metrics to discern
whether progress is being made towards building
capable and efficient security apparatuses, and to
assess the performance outcomes of budgetary
resources towards security ends. Benchmarks
should reflect the transition of the security sector
from an emphasis on combating “enemies of the
state,” towards providing law and order and justice
services to citizens. Policy innovations that are
needed to address this fundamental weakness
include: (i) collaboration among multilateral and
bilateral actors to establish model security sector
delivery benchmarks that can be used in the SSR
review process; (ii) developing standard unit
costs for services delivered in given contexts; and
(iii) integrating these benchmarks into annual
budget exercises and medium-term expenditure
frameworks. To support movement towards a
service delivery model for the security sector,
the Development Assistance Committee of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD/DAC), in collaboration with
the UN and IFIs, should establish a standard set
of objectively verifiable indicators and means of
verification.
4. STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL CAPACITIES
TO SUPPORT RIGHT-FINANCING
To strengthen the assessment of security systems,
policy makers should consider establishing a pool
of expertise across international organizations
and bilateral agencies. This pool should include
fiscal, public finance, public sector restructuring,
aid management, SSR, and revenue experts. To
strengthen SSR implementation, policy makers
should: (i) actively promote the migration of public
sector reform and financial management experts
to the civilian components of the ministries of
defense, interior, policing, and justice entities;
(ii) conduct a multi-agency assessment of the
comparative advantages of different UN, IFIs, and
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bilateral agencies to support SSR; (iii) develop
support operations to strengthen the role of
ministries of finance in security sector budgetary
processes; and (iv) mainstream procurement
arrangements for the sector to maximize
accountability and minimize corruption.
The proposals advanced here are intended to
improve the quantity, quality, and sustainability
of security services, benefiting the international
community and their taxpayers, as well as
recipient governments and most importantly
their citizens. As post-conflict states struggle to
gain traction towards creating a virtuous cycle,
in which security promotes economic growth
and political stability, and vice versa, issues of
scale, prioritization, effectiveness and efficiency
become fundamental to the delivery of security
services. The aim is to build responsive security
capacities without forcing governments into a
fiscal abyss thereby mortgaging the government’s
future. If sustainable solutions are to be found for
the problems of statebuilding, right-financing the
security sector is a necessity.
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RIGHT-FINANCING
SECURITY SECTOR
REFORM

PETER MIDDLEBROOK AND GORDON PEAKE1
Insecurity costs. Without security, many states
risk remaining weak and fragile states. Insecurity
hinders economic growth, exacerbates poverty,
cultivates fear among citizens, and presents
significant challenges for democratic governance.
Attempts to arrest insecurity strain government
resources and redirect them from more
economically productive ends.2
As a result, improving security – for the state and
for its citizens - is emerging as a top priority of the
international state-building agenda in countries
as diverse and demanding as Afghanistan, Sierra
Leone, and Timor-Leste.3 Perhaps nowhere is this
more necessary than in post-conflict environments,
where reestablishing sustainable, legitimate
security is essential to wider social and economic
recovery efforts.
The concept of right-financing for the security
sector “involves the determination of sustainable
policies and strategies, institutions and service
delivery capacities that balance security,
governance, service quality and fiscal sustainability
concerns in weak and fragile states.”4 Right1 Peter Middlebrook, formerly an economist with the World Bank, is
co-founder and director of Middlebrook & Miller, a firm specializing in
international finance, economic development and post-conflict reconstruction.
Middlebrook is the originator of the term and developed the concept of “rightfinancing.” Gordon Peake is a Senior Associate with Libra Advisory Group, a
security and justice reform consultancy based in London. The authors would
like to thank Louise Andersen, Nicole Ball, James K. Boyce, Rahul Chandran,
Mark Downes, and Jake Sherman for their comments and suggestions.
2 Violence in Latin America – the region in which its costs have been most
frequently quantified – imposes an estimated annual cost of US$15 billion in lost
wealth and income, representing anywhere between 5 and 25 percent or more of
counties’ gross domestic product (GDP) in particular years. See Erik Alda, Mayra
Buvinic, and Jorge Lamas,“Neighbourhood Peacekeeping:The Inter-American
Development Bank’s Violence Reduction Programs in Colombia and Uruguay,”
Civil Wars, Vol. 8, No. 2, (2006), p. 200.
3 Increased attention to security as a governance issue has been accompanied
by a parallel focus, following September 11, 2001, on “hard” security issues related
to counter-terrorism.These goals are often conflictual.
4 Middlebrook P, J,“Right-financing the Future: Lessons for Asian and
European Peace Processes”, Asia Europe Journal, Vol. 6. No. 1, Springer Verlag
(2008).

financing is therefore essentially about determining
an acceptable trade-off between “right-sizing”
security forces and higher-quality and more
equitable security services over time.5
“Security sector reform” (SSR) is the term used to
describe programs adopted by governments with
the support of international partners to achieve
professional security institutions that meet the
needs of citizens, society, and the state and which
operate within the rule of law and under effective
democratic control.6 Addressing the wide range
of state institutions with a formal mandate to
ensure the safety and security of the state and
its citizens, SSR’s goals are both immediate and
long-term. In the short-term, it is intended to
improve the ability of a country’s military, police,
justice and intelligence organizations to provide
basic and equitable security. Its long-term aims,
however, are much more ambitious: to ensure that
security institutions serve the interests of society
as a whole, rather than those of a political elite
or grouping. This involves radical changes to the
management, purpose, structure, financing and
values of security organizations.

SSR’s goals are both immediate
and long-term.
Providing security has its costs as well as benefits.
In post-conflict settings, these costs are often
unavoidably high. For this reason, issues of financial
management are central to security sector reform.
Yet in the majority of cases, the medium and
long-term fiscal implications of short-run policy
decisions have not been factored sufficiently into
early post-conflict engagement processes. On
one hand, national fiscal capacities are frequently
overlooked by donors when making security sector
assistance decisions. All too often, donors burden
states with security sectors they cannot afford, and
5 OECD/DAC, Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security
and Justice, (Paris: OECD, 2007), p. 75. Available at www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/
if-ssr
6 M. Caparini,“Security Sector Reform and NATO and EU Enlargement,” SIPRI
Yearbook 2003, cited in Gordon Peake and Eric Scheye,“To Arrest Insecurity:
Time for a Revised Security Sector Reform Agenda,” Conflict, Security, and
Development, Vol. 5, No. 3, (2005), p. 299.
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at the same time effectively mortgage their own
aid budgets to supporting them in the medium to
long term. Weak government revenues coupled
with significant external support to state security
institutions breeds aid dependency. What revenue
the state is able to generate is disproportionately
allocated to security institutions at the expense
of other, vital needs. This “live now, pay later”
approach to SSR risks, over the medium to longterm, undermining the very statebuilding process
it is meant to support. On the other hand, too
great a focus on existing revenue constraints could
lead to the under-provision of security, as fixed
non-service delivery costs are often funded first.
Without financing immediate defence, policing,
correctional, and justice needs, the “buy only what
you can afford” approach risks the statebuilding
process in the short term.
Fiscal sustainability and the provision of adequate
security cannot both be achieved at the same
time in countries such as Afghanistan, Kosovo or
Sierra Leone. Existing revenue constraints would
lead to the under-provision of security, since fixed
non-service delivery costs are often funded first.
Rather, a middle approach that moves towards a
fiscally sustainable path sequentially, trading off
fiscal capacities with actual needs is required.
To address cost efficiency and sustainability issues,
the “right-financing” approach should be adopted
by both security and development institutions.7
Right-financing is about finding an acceptable
balance between the size (and composition) of the
security sector required by current circumstances
– “right-sizing” – and achieving fiscally sustainable
security sector expenditure over time based
on honest appraisal of resource projections.
Determining sustainable levels minimizes risks
associated with future under-funding of security
due to financial constraints, including the risk
of overly stringent application of fiscal policy
conditionalities by IFIs.8 At the same time, it
decreases the likelihood of expansionary security
policies that crowd out other public spending
and push back opportunities for early exit by the
international community.
7

Middlebrook (2008).

8 OECD/DAC, Handbook on Security System Reform, p. 75.

/2/

This paper outlines what a right-financing
approach looks like, why it is beneficial, and how it
can be achieved through existing institutions with
enhanced collaboration, established tools, and new
measures. The paper begins with a brief overview
of the public finance origins of SSR. We then
offer four sets of recommendations based on the
right-financing approach. The first is that security
should become a normalized element of the statebuilding agenda, integrated into peace agreements,
post-conflict needs assessments, development
strategies, and expenditure planning. The second
set resolves around aligning the security sector
with budgetary and political realities. The third set
focuses on adopting a “service delivery” model for
security.The fourth relates to capacity building and
good management in both national governments
and the international organizations that assist
them.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SSR CONCEPT
It is now accepted wisdom that security and
development are inter-linked and mutually
reinforcing. The policy justification for SSR is
that a security sector that is effective, efficient,
equitable, accountable and sustainable is an
essential precondition for creating an enabling
environment for wider economic, social and
political development. The expanding roster of
actors engaged in SSR attests to the importance
attached to it as a tool for development and
conflict management.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development’s Development Assistance
Committee (OECD/DAC) has been the institutional
locus for much SSR policy development. Its
definition of the “security system”9 indicates both
the breadth of vision in SSR and the scale of the
task that confronts would-be reformers:
»» Core

security actors: armed forces; police
service; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces;
presidential guards; intelligence and security
services (both military and civilian); coast
guards; border guards; customs authorities; and

9 The OECD/DAC uses the phrase “security system” instead of “security sector.”
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reserve or local security units (civil defense
forces, national guards, militias).
»» Management

and oversight bodies: the

executive, national security advisory bodies,
legislative and legislative select committees;
ministries of defense, internal affairs, foreign
affairs; customary and traditional authorities;
financial
management
bodies
(finance
ministries, budget officers, financial audit and
planning units); and civil society organizations
(civilian review boards and public complaints
commissions).

law: judiciary and justice
ministries; prisons; criminal investigation
and prosecution services; human rights
commissions and ombudsmen; and customary
and traditional justice systems.

This lacuna is odd in two respects. Firstly, it
ignores the doctrine’s own intellectual lineage:
the roots of SSR lie in discussions and debates
in the mid-1990s as to how best to “down-size,”
or “right-size,” state military structures in Eastern
Europe. Much of the early writing on SSR had a
clear financial focus, dealing with expenditure
reviews, off-budget expenditure and accounting
best practice.11 Secondly, current SSR policy and
programming remains largely oblivious to the
real-world relevance of public finance issues and
the consequences that ensue when these are
insufficiently considered.

»» Justice and the rule of

»» Non-statutory

security forces: liberation
armies, guerrilla armies, private security
companies, and political party militias.10

SSR encompasses a broad range of methods to
improve the capacity, governance, performance, and
sustainability of the sector.These include retraining
police, reforming penal systems, restructuring
military and intelligence organizations, creating
or strengthening internal and external oversight
and accountability mechanisms, and building
organizational capacity. In post-conflict situations,
SSR is also linked closely with demobilization,
disarmament, and reintegration (DDR).
Financial aspects of the security sector are
acknowledged in the OECD/DAC definition,
under the rubric of management and oversight
structures. Financial dimensions of SSR include
allocating resources according to priorities, both
across sectors and within the security sector,
and ensuring that expenditure is transparent. But
an examination of both SSR literature and SSR
programs reveals that, in practice, this has been a
curiously neglected topic.
10 OECD/DAC, Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security
and Justice, (Paris: OECD, 2007), p. 22. Available at www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/
if-ssr

Financial dimensions of SSR have
been a curiously neglected topic.
The negative consequences of this neglect –
unsustainable reforms, under-provision of security,
and the squeezing out of other vital sectors – are
belatedly beginning to drive greater attention to
the public finance aspects of security. There seems
to be growing willingness by donors to adopt
whole-of-government approaches and to cooperate
among themselves. But moving from stove-piped
decision-making to integrated policy requires
attention to more than the “3Ds” of development,
defence, and diplomacy: it must also include
finance ministries and funding instruments. In the
words of a recent study on reform in post-conflict
states, “money matters.” 12
The four proposals that follow lay out the
foundations for a right-financing approach to the
fiscal dimensions of security that is designed to
contribute to sustainable, long-term stability and
development.

11 Nicole Ball,“Addressing Military Expenditures and Military Roles in
Developing Countries: A Review Of Members’ Approaches,” paper prepared
for the Information DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development
Cooperation, 1998; Dylan Hendrickson and Nicole Ball,“Good Practice and
Working Principles in Security System Reform,” report produced for the OECD
DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, 2003; Andrew
Cottey and Anthony Forster, Reshaping Defence: New Roles for Military
Cooperation and Assistance, Adelphi Paper No. 365, (London, IISS, 2004).
12 Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater than the Sum of its Parts:
Accessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile States, (New York:
International Peace Academy, 2007), p. 8.
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Proposal 1: Build security into peace
agreements, post-conflict needs
assessments, development strategies,
and expenditure planning
For the security sector to reach a sustainable
form, size, and function, best practice suggests
that reform must be based on an overall
national vision, a national threat assessment,
a security environment analysis, a SSR review,
and the provisional fiscal framework. In postconflict countries, the foundation for these
processes is determined in large measure by the
political settlement and subsequent transitional
arrangements. The interests of informal networks
within security institutions often run counter to
the trajectory of reforms proposed by outsiders.
All too often, force establishment decisions gain
political buy-in prior to any assessment of the
implications of their recurrent or capital costs.
As a result, agreed political commitments can
be financially unattainable, necessitating ad hoc,
mid-course, downward revisions. Since the 1999
Lomé Accord, for example, the size of the army in
Sierra Leone has been decreased due to financial
realities from 17,000 to 10,500 troops – and may
be further cut to 8,500 in the medium term. The
ad hoc approach to planning that yields such
unrealistic force sizes is inefficient and wasteful,
diverting limited financial resources from other
development priorities.

All too often, force establishment
decisions gain political buyin prior to any assessment of the
implications of their costs.
Fiscal sustainability for security forces is a longterm issue, but its prospects for success are
influenced by early decisions. For this reason,
a right-financing approach should start with
peace agreements. These provide the road map
for political normalization, the establishment
of transitional authority and the strengthening
of public administration, as well as for the
demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration
of former combatants, and the transformation

/4/

of security institutions. Bringing right-financing
considerations to the negotiating table can
minimize the problems caused by fiscally blind
security policies. Peace agreements should indicate
that size targets for the security sector are subject
to fiscal constraints, and therefore tentative.
A right-financing approach also means including
security in multilateral planning processes. A postconflict needs assessment (PCNA) is the main tool
used by donors for assessing the reconstruction
costs and needs. However, security is often not
addressed in these “comprehensive” assessments,
remaining the purview of police and military
“experts” outside the process. This has resulted
in oversized security sectors that the state can ill
afford.The 2001 Afghanistan Reconstruction Needs
Assessment, for example, underestimated the level
of security expenditure required, while at the
same time factoring in security improvements that
did not materialize.13 As a result, the 2002 donors’
conference in Tokyo did not raise adequate funds
for security, a problem that has been addressed
only as Afghanistan’s security has deteriorated.
Joint assessments that incorporate the security
sector are advocated by both the new OECD
Implementation Framework for SSR and the
proposed UN/World Bank draft guidelines for
PCNA/Transitional Results Frameworks (TRF).
The PCNA/TRF guidelines note that political and
security issues should be “treated as an integral
part of the national planning and budgetary
process, rather than through separate fora
which may lead to a lack of transparency or the
taking of decisions which are unfunded, fiscally
unsustainable or undermine other reconstruction
elements.”14 Whether led by government, the
UN, or IFIs, these assessments seek to bring
government and external actors together to agree
on a common set of principles and priorities.
Ideally, the needs assessment includes an inception

13 Asian Development Bank, UNAMA, UNDP, World Bank, Securing
Afghanistan’s Future, March 2004, p. 79.
14 United Nations Development Group/World Bank,“Joint Guidance Note
on Integrated Recovery Planning using Post Conflict Needs Assessments and
Transitional Results Frameworks,”Working Draft for Circulation, September 2007,
p. 14
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phase of dialogue with the whole-of-government,15
followed by a specific SSR assessment. As many
of these issues are extremely political, fostering
a supportive environment is vital to managing
the process of change. The inception phase
should support contextual understanding of key
problems and needs, with the SSR assessment then
identifying strategic interventions to reform the
form, function, and financing arrangements across
the sector. Including the security sector in initial
needs assessments is a powerful statement of
intent on the part of donors: it acknowledges the
need to mainstream SSR into wider development
strategies, and not treat the sector as “stand-alone.”
A well-timed SSR assessment would be a useful
tool to recalibrate force sizes to fiscal issues. This
process could also help identify where and how
trust funds might be established and aligned to the
national budgetary process.
In the early post-conflict period, IFIs are well
placed to conduct quick fiscal analysis to determine
the likely size and trajectory of the domestic
revenue base. While IFIs traditionally have not
engaged with the security sector, the World Bank’s
decision to conduct an expenditure review of the
security sector in Afghanistan demonstrated their
potential to play a valuable role. The argument the
Articles of Agreement of the World Bank restrict
support in this area was usefully re-interpreted
in this instance, providing a precedent for future
engagement on the financial dimensions of SSR.
IFIs should help to develop provisional postconflict macro-fiscal forecasts based on available
information or pre-conflict analysis. While conflict
often leads to contraction of the formal taxable
economy, informed estimates of both the overall
fiscal envelope and the likely envelope for the
security sector would assist planners in making
decisions early on in the reform process, while also
informing decisions related to the establishment
of trust funds. This information would permit
more realistic decisions about pay, grading and
force size. Implicit in right-financing, therefore, is
removing the shroud of secrecy that often cloaks
security spending.
15 A number of whole-of-government exercises have been established to
enhance the alignment of civilian and military forms to international assistance
(UK PCU, US State/CRS, Germany, etc.).

PROPOSAL 2: ALIGN SHORT-RUN SECURITY
POLICY PRIORITIES AND SPENDING
DECISIONS WITH LONG-TERM NATIONAL
BUDGETARY AND POLITICAL REALITIES
SSR assessment must consider the short, medium,
and long-term security and fiscal impacts of
different force sizes, functions, and pay and
grading options. Above all, international actors and
their counterparts in national government need to
pay more attention to the medium- to long-term
fiscal consequences of short-term restructuring
decisions.
Political realities in fragile states pose a
considerable challenge for doing so. At present,
such decisions are often made on the basis of
national governments concerned about protecting
their authority, rather than their people, or
by international donors concerned about
international security. In transitional governments,
powerful political figures often control defense
and law and order institutions, enabling them to
obstruct reform efforts based on fiscal priorities
and a realistic security threat assessment that
might undermine their personal authority.
Right-financing argues that the budget ought to
be the primary tool of policy – and that security
threat assessment should be funded in a balanced
and fiscally sensitive manner. The costs of running
the Afghan National Army, for instance, remain far
beyond the capacities of state, with on-budget
security expenditures totaling 485 percent of
domestic revenue collection in 2005/2006.16 In
Sierra Leone, UK-led reform of the military and
law enforcement sectors likewise created an army
and a police that the state cannot easily afford.17
In the short to medium term, special trust funds
established by donors can support payment of
police or military staff where state revenues
remain wholly insufficient. But such arrangements
16 World Bank, Afghanistan: Managing Public Finances for Development.
Volume V: Improving Public Finance Management in the Security Sector.
Washington, D.C.: World Bank, Report No. 34582-AF, December 22, 2005.
17 Adrian Horn, Funmi Olonisakin and Gordon Peake ‘UK-led SSR in Sierra
Leone’ in Gordon Peake, Eric Scheye and Alice Hills, eds., Managing Insecurity:
Field Experiences of Security Sector Reform (London:Taylor and Francis 2007).
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should include clear “exit strategies” for an orderly
transition to a normal budgetary process.
In assessing security needs, a key question
guiding national policy must be, “security for
whom?” Whether the security sector is oriented
towards ensuring the safety of citizens, protecting
the power of ruling elites, or shielding the
international community from terrorism has
direct implications for how priorities, targets, and
financing mechanisms are determined. Based on
a realistic fiscal estimate for the entire security
sector, attention should be given to: (i) conducting
a pay and grading review to determine market
comparative wage scales; and (ii) right-sizing the
army, police, justice and penal systems as one
unified process rather than four distinct ones.

Strengthening civilian oversight should
not take a back seat to building up the
operational capacity of security forces.
The sustainability of SSR also hinges on that oftrepeated mantra, local ownership. It is clear that
the SSR process needs to involve a strong civilian
element and should focus not just on the quantity
of security services, but their quality as well.
Where civilian perceptions of security have taken
a greater role in defining priorities for reform – as,
for example, in Sierra Leone – national security
is often not identified as the biggest threat. This
suggests that strengthening civilian oversight
should not take a back seat to building up the
operational capacity of security forces. The size,
structure, and function of the security and justice
sectors ought to be transformed based on demand,
rather than simply supply.
In a world in which inter-state wars are diminishing
in number, and where, as in Africa, national armies
have been notoriously detrimental for peace and
development, there may be good reasons for nations
not to have a standing army. A corollary question is
whether a well-trained and well-managed national
police service – with the appropriate border and
custom units – might serve as a viable substitute.

In Central America, Costa Rica abolished its
military in 1948, demonstrating since that time
that sovereignty and statehood need not require
armed forces. Taking this one argument one step
further, we can consider the implications of the
fact that non-state systems are the main providers
of security and justice for some 80-90 percent of
the population of post-conflict and other fragile
states.18 In many cases, such non-state systems are
more effective, accessible, legitimate, and cheaper
than the formal security sector. In certain contexts,
such institutions might serve as viable alternatives
to the state, or at least as interim providers pending
the build-up of formal institutions.
PROPOSAL 3: MOVE TO A SERVICE DELIVERY
MODEL FOR THE SECURITY SECTOR
A critical step in developing an appropriate,
affordable security sector is to cost and prioritize
investments for the army, police, justice and
penal institutions. Service delivery benchmarks
are commonly set for sectors such as health and
transport, but all too often not for the security
sector. Here, measurement is poor, if not altogether
absent. One result is a lack of certainty as to what
reform activities are actually being conducted, how
they are implemented, what is being achieved, and
whether the reforms are effective or not. In most
cases there are no reliable, valid metrics to discern
whether progress is being made towards building
capable, efficient, and institutionally robust police
apparatuses, nor to assess the performance of those
trying to achieve this. The metrics that are relied
upon instead are less than meaningful because they
measure outputs rather than outcomes. “Numbers
trained” is the most frequently used indicator of
progress, but this is at best a poor guide to either
quality or capability. In Afghanistan, for example,
we know the numbers of national police and
soldiers trained; less is known about the impact
of this hastily trained (and frequently unvetted)
assemblage in providing security.19
18 OECD,“Enhancing the Delivery of Justice and Security: Governance, Peace,
and Security,” (Paris: OECD, 2007).“Non-state systems” refer to all traditional,
customary, religious, and informal mechanisms that operate alongside formal state
institutions and exercise some form of authority for provision of security and
justice.They include traditional courts, tribal militias, community watch groups,
village elder councils, political party security, and private security companies.
19 Seth G. Jones, Andrew Rathmell Jeremy M. Wilson & K. Jack Riley,
Establishing Law and Order After Conflict, (Washington, DC: RAND, 2005.)
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“Numbers trained” is at best a poor
guide to either quality or capability.
Policy innovations that are needed to address this
fundamental weakness include (i) collaboration
among multilateral and bilateral actors to establish
model service delivery benchmarks for defense,
police, justice and penal systems that can be used
in the SSR review process; (ii) developing standard
unit costs for services delivered in a given context;
and (iii) integrating these benchmarks into annual
budget formulation exercises and mediumterm expenditure frameworks. The benchmarks
should reflect the transition of security sector
from an emphasis on combating “enemies of
the state,” towards providing law and order and
justice services to citizens. Once service delivery
benchmarks have been set, and based on the
provisional unit costs, external donor support may
be required while meeting fundamental public
finance principles of affordability, discipline, and
predictability.
PROPOSAL 4: STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL
CAPACITIES TO SUPPORT RIGHT-FINANCING
The ability of international actors to support SSR
generally, and right-financing specifically, faces two
challenges, coherence and capacity:
• Coherence: When the external institutions
involved
behave
in
an
un-strategic,
uncoordinated manner, the already complex
process of reform becomes virtually intractable.
In Afghanistan, for example, five lead nations
were charged with developing security policy in
each of five SSR “pillars”: DDR (Japan), building
the Afghan National Army (USA), training the
police (Germany), legal reform (Italy), and
counter-narcotics (the United Kingdom). The
five were embarrassingly uncoordinated: each
lead nation pursued its own vision of reform
with little concern for how the government
would bear the associated recurrent financial
costs, or for how reforms within sub-sectors
linked up across the sector as a whole. Key
dimensions, like intelligence reform, were

left out of SSR altogether. The result was the
antithesis of the unified strategy advocated
above. Right-financing cannot be adopted by
individual agencies acting alone; it requires
cooperation among multilateral and bilateral
donors. We are not naïve as to the challenges of
finding concordance between institutions. But
neither are we naïve as to the price of failing to
address these challenges.
• Capacity: Reform is fundamentally about
building institutions. For this reason, the
personnel recruited to execute programs need
to possess the requisite expertise in capacity
building, management, and
institutional
development. The needs involve not only
professional police-work and soldiery, but
also staff versed in financial management –
accountants, auditors, bookkeepers, and office
managers.20 But just because one is (or was) a
member of an institution in one country does
not necessarily make one capable of reforming
the same institution in another. Building the
capacity of security institutions requires
qualified personnel and capacities within
the donors and implementing organizations
themselves. In other words, good capacity
building needs to begin at home.
The first phase of external assistance for SSR is
assessment. In spite of the fact that the international
community regularly supports “reconstruction
needs assessments” in post-conflict countries,
there is no universally prescribed methodology for
doing so, nor is there a specialized institution with
a pool of expertise to undertake such assessments.
The needs assessments often are followed by
poorly sequenced external assistance, provided
before the capacities of budgetary institutions have
been established. This leads to the “projectization”
of the national budget, the emergence of parallel
delivery systems, and a second civil service – the
aid community.

20 Eric Scheye,“Transitions to local authority” in Renata Dwan, ed., Executive
Policing: Enforcing the Law in Peace Operations (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003).
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To strengthen needs assessments in general, and
the assessment of security systems in particular,
policy makers should consider establishing a pool
of expertise across international organizations
(e.g., the UN, IFIs, the European Union, NATO,
and the African Union) and bilaterals. This pool
should include fiscal, public finance, public sector
restructuring, aid management, and revenue
experts. Policy makers should also assess how
international support can prime the pump for
revenue mobilization.21 The needs assessment
methodology could consider the potential role of
the security sector in addressing revenue issues,
including the need for measures to limit the risks
of non-state capture of state revenues.
Once needs assessments are completed, security
sector assistance programs need to be planned
and implemented. The manner in which such
programs are designed and managed frequently
militate against the achievement of intended
goals every bit as much as the difficult, contested,
environs in which they take place. For example,
during the UN transitional administration for
East Timor, of an approved complement of 1,250
CIVPOL (international civilian police) personnel,
only two posts were allocated to institutional and
organizational police service development. 22
To strengthen SSR implementation, policy makers
should: (i) actively promote the migration of public
sector restructuring experts, including those
focused on administrative and civil service reform,
as well as public finance management (PFM)
experts, to build the capabilities of the civilian parts
of the ministries of defense, interior and policing
entities; (ii) conduct a multi-agency assessment of
the comparative advantages of different UN, IFI
and bilateral agencies to support SSR; (iii) develop
support operations to strengthen the role of
ministries of finance in budgetary process towards
the security sector, including its involvement in
21 See the paper in this series by Michael Carnahan,“Options for Revenue
Generation in Post-Conflict Environments,” (November 2007).
22 Ludovic Hood ‘Missed Opportunities:The United Nations, Police Service and
Defence Force Development in Timor-Leste, 1999–2004’ in Gordon Peake, Eric
Scheye and Alice Hills, eds., Managing Insecurity: Field Experiences of Security
Sector Reform, (London:Taylor and Francis 2007), p.152
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national security council and coordination fora; and
(iv) mainstream procurement arrangements for the
sector to maximize efficiency and accountability
and to minimize corruption.

The aim is to build responsive
security capacities without forcing
governments into a fiscal abyss
and mortgaging their future.
Finally, the international community needs to
establish a performance-based, outcome-oriented
monitoring and evaluation framework for SSR
programming. Assessing the impact of public
spending on security has been almost impossible
in post-conflict states. Moreover, in the absence of
performance-based indicators of enhanced equity
and quality in service delivery, key issues related
to horizontal equity – ensuring that security
coverage is not biased towards certain groups,
and that employment opportunities within the
security services are equitably distributed - have
been routinely neglected. To support movement
towards a service delivery model for the security
sector, we recommend that (i) the OECD/DAC,
in collaboration with the UN and IFIs, work to
establish a standard set of objectively verifiable
indicators and means of verification; and (ii)
multilateral and bilateral donors support the
development of information management and
public expenditure tracking systems within
national defense and policing institutions.
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Conclusion
The proposals advanced here are intended to
improve the quantity, quality, and sustainability
of security services, benefiting the international
community and their taxpayers, as well as
recipient governments and most importantly
their citizens. As post-conflict states struggle to
gain traction towards creating a virtuous cycle,
in which security promotes economic growth
and political stability, and vice versa, issues of
scale, prioritization, effectiveness and efficiency
become fundamental to the delivery of security
services. The challenge is not to choose between
fiscal and macro-economic insecurity on one side
or the underprovision of physical security on the
other, but to strike an acceptable balance. The aim
is to build responsive security capacities without
forcing the governments into a fiscal abyss and
mortgaging their future. If sustainable solutions
are to be found for the problems of statebuilding,
right-financing the security sector is a necessity.
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